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The expansion of credit rating agencies into emerging markets is examined with respect to the 
overall quality of informational signals provided by ratings to capital markets. Corporate ratings 
from six developing economies with relatively sophisticated financial sectors are modeled using 
ordered probit estimation techniques. The paper finds that the informational content in emerging-
market corporate credit ratings is poor ipso facto and compared to similar models of developed 
market ratings, and suggests that the sample countries are subject to what is termed an ‘emerging 
market premium’. The consequences of this hypothesis for applications in development finance 
and regulatory regimes are briefly considered. Procyclicality is not found to be a problem, but 
this is attributed to clustering rather than through-the-cycle design. It is concluded that corporate 
credit ratings currently do not actively enhance efficient financial intermediation in developing 
financial markets and are not a sufficient criterion for risk allocation in regulatory regimes. 
Keywords: Corporate Credit Rating, Ordered Probit, Financial Intermediation 
 
1. Introduction 
As with many fields in contemporary economics, the discourse around 
banking regulation and global financial development has been appropriated by 
researchers who have an overwhelming preoccupation with issues arising from the 
2008 United States financial collapse and the subsequent global stagnation. The 
extent of the complicity of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) in financial system 
fragility after the crisis was thrown into sharp relief (Crotty, 2009), prompting a 
wave of renewed research interest into the role and function of the credit rating 
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industry in the financial system. Similarly, the sovereign debt crisis in Southern 
Europe has sparked intense political economy research into sovereign debt ratings 
(Silver, 2011).  The rapid expansion of the corporate credit rating industry into 
emerging markets over the past decade has attracted less attention.  This paper 
seeks to extend the critical analysis of CRA operations into a third field by testing 
the quality of the informational signals credit ratings provide to international 
capital markets about firms domiciled in developing nations.  
After providing a short assessment of the economic function of CRAs and a 
review of empirical literature, an ordered probit model which regresses rating 
actions on a number of financial and macroeconomic variables to determine the 
quality of the informational content of the ratings is developed. The operational 
hypothesis that this analysis attempts to falsify is that ratings do not provide 
information that is not already readily available to investors.  
In order to demonstrate the importance of the findings in the policy domain, 
the discussion turns to two explanations of the increasing importance of credit 
ratings in financial markets. The first is part of the efficient market hypothesis, and 
is that credit ratings agencies provide informational service to capital markets by 
sending a highly condensed signal of the default risk attached to debt issued by a 
given firm.  The argument is that this enhances financial intermediation which in 
turn enhances growth (Mishkin, 2006; Bencivenga and Smith, 1991).  The second 
is institutionalisation: that is, the increased use of credit ratings in financial 
regulations, such as the Basel II and III regulatory accords (Sarma, 2007).  It is 
hoped that this early exploration of the economic value of corporate credit ratings 
in emerging markets can be used to guide the growth of the credit rating industry 
effectively. 
  
2. Overview of  the Global Credit Rating Industry 
2.1 Micro-foundations 
The existence of CRAs can be understood at a basic level from within the 
framework of informational microeconomics that began with Akerlof (1970) and 
has since been applied as a framework for the economics of banking and finance, 
most notably by Mishkin (1992). In this context CRAs are seen as information 
providers that smooth informational asymmetries between lenders and borrowers 
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that would otherwise arise due to the inability of lenders to predict default risk 
accurately. Cantor and Packer (1994) describe CRAs as institutions that employ 
proprietary statistical methods to assign a rating to a government, organization or 
debt instrument based on the probability of a default on their debt obligations. 
CRAs collect and analyse large amounts of both publicly available and privately 
released data and publish information in the form of a credit rating to the market, 
providing the market with information that is not widely available in the public 
domain and which has been analysed using specialized statistical techniques. This 
rating supposedly signals the risk inherent in particular credit transactions to the 
lender, thereby ameliorating the moral hazard and adverse selection problems. 
Becker and Milbourne (2011) add that a secondary purpose of CRAs is to limit 
duplication of effort between lenders by making information about default and 
recovery rates widely available. 
There are currently three dominant players in the global credit ratings market: 
Moody’s Investor Services, Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and Fitch Ratings. All 
three publish ratings on scales equivalent to the one in Table 1 below, with AAA 
describing a very low probability of default and C the highest. S&P and Moody’s 
have dominated the industry since their formation in the early 20
th
 century, while 
Fitch, according to Becker and Milbourne (2011), has recently come to prominence 
through a process of aggressive acquisition. CRAs maintain in their disclaimers 
that their rating product is a subjective opinion based on their proprietary statistical 













Table 1: Standard and Poor’s Credit Rating Scale. 
Source: Adapted from Standard and Poor’s (2012)  
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Cantor and Packer (1994) provide the seminal description of the historical 
emergence of CRAs. The Big Three CRAs all began in the Northeast USA, but 
have grown out of their home base to dominate the global market, with a new 
focus on expanding operations in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, East Asia and 
Latin America. The World Bank (2009) posits that the reason for the dominance of 
so few firms is the importance of reputational capital, which is gained through a 
build-up of historical default prediction success. New credit rating firms struggle to 
prove the credibility of their opinions to investors, especially in skills-deprived 
developing markets. A watershed in the history of the rating market, according to 
Cantor and Packer (1994), occurred in the 1970s, when the rating agencies 
switched from subscription revenues to ‘issuer-pays’ which continues to provide 
most of their revenues. Johannson (2010) claims that the reason for the switch was 
increased demand for creditability from issuers following a series of defaults on 
American bond markets. Strier (2008) adds that the cost of maintaining a staff of 
experts was becoming increasingly unfeasible on the subscription model and that 
the free-rider problem as described by Gurley (1954) was particularly problematic 
in the subscription rating publication model after the advent of the photocopier 
allowed for easy sharing of a CRAs list of ratings. 
 
2.2. Qualitative Market Critiques 
Several criticisms have been leveled at the current market-level practices of 
CRAs and their ability to perform their function as reliable information-providers. 
In particular, academics have focused on conflicts of interest in the issuer-pays 
model and the problematic market structure in the global credit ratings industry 
(Crotty, 2009), as well as trying to determine whether credit-ratings contribute to 
the inherent procyclicality of the financial system. In developed economies the 
market for credit ratings is riddled with perverse incentives and conflicts of 
interest. Johannson (2010) notes that rating agencies are forced to compete with 
each other for the right to issue solicited ratings. Since agencies work on the issuer-
pays model, this creates the incentive to offer issuers the best possible ratings, 
conflicting with the objectivity of their opinion. In response to this criticism many 
have argued that CRAs simply cannot issue biased ratings due to the importance of 
maintaining their reputational capital (Hunt, 2009:6). However, Nazareth (2003) 
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has documented SEC evidence of CRAs changing their rating opinion on CDOs in 
response to profit incentives.  
The credit rating market provides an interesting case study of the relationship 
between market structure and quality. Regulators such as Nazareth (2003) have 
accused rating agencies of using aggressive practices in an abusive way to 
maintain their dominance. Hunt (2009) claims that the ‘Big 3’ agencies command 
95% of global market share. The World Bank (2009) does acknowledge that, 
although there are many smaller regional players in the international credit ratings 
market, they all fail to gain traction in market share against the large agencies. 
Reputational considerations are a significant barrier to entry for smaller firms, 
preventing any approximation of perfect competition. Despite the possible 
existence of excessive market power in the global rating industry, however, 
increasing competition is not a prima facie solution. Becker and Milbourn (2011) 
present robust econometric evidence of a relationship between the rise in market 
share of Fitch against Moody’s and S&P and declining rating quality in the 
industry. Similarly, as noted by Cantor and Packer (1994) the move of the credit 
rating industry into Japan in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in large differences 
between solicited and unsolicited ratings. There seems to be a catch-22 in which 
lack of competition leads to an oligopolistic abuse of market power while small 
increases in competition trigger a race to the bottom in overall quality of ratings. 
As with other market structures there is no easy ‘from theory’ regulatory solution.  
The competitive structure of the credit ratings industry is a significant policy 
challenge for regulators attempting to integrate the expansionary ambitions of 
CRAs into emerging market financial stability mechanisms. Although it does not 
directly address market structure, the empirical section of this paper contains 
insights that might be used as a starting point for deeper analysis of the problem.  
At the macroeconomic level, a long tradition of analysis (originating before 
Fisher, proceeding through, Keynes, Friedman and Minsky, 1975 to Bernanke, 
Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996 and others) has accepted financial procyclicality as a 
core property of the business cycle. Regulators are generally concerned with 
minimising the procyclicality inherent in finance. Credit ratings, through their 
dissemination of information to the market, should be in a position to smooth some 
of the cyclical behavior in financial markets. However, there is a growing body of 
literature which suggests that this is not always the case. Borio et. al. (2002) for 
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instance provides evidence of procyclical credit ratings in Korea and Thailand 
before and after the 1998 Asian crisis. Evidence of procyclicality in credit ratings 
is particularly worrying when considered in conjunction with the use of credit 
ratings in capital allocation in the Basel capital accords. Banks are permitted under 
Basel II to select a probability of default band into which their loans can be slotted, 
and weight their risk profile accordingly. If credit ratings are procyclical, then the 
bank’s risk profile is misrepresented according to the time in the cycle the decision 
was made. Illing and Pauling (2005) construct a model of bank capital based on 
varying starting distributions of credit ratings in the portfolio of bank capital 
holdings, finding evidence of procyclicality through the cycle. Catarineu-Rabell et 
al. (2005) confirm this finding. This could lead to up to 15% increases in capital 
requirements in a recession, reducing bank’s ability to lend and amplifying 
procyclicality. The concern among regulators that credit ratings are procyclical is 
sufficient to include an investigation into procyclicality in the emerging markets 
included in this study. 
The macroeconomic importance of CRAs and thus of the question of 
cyclicality has grown with the inclusion of rating agencies as a cog in the system of 
global financial regulation. Detailed discussion of the so-called ‘New Financial 
Architecture’ is beyond the scope of this study (see for example, Best, 2003; 
Crotty, 2009; Gowan, 2009). What is relevant here is that while they have been 
part of regulatory frameworks since the 1930s, Basel II elevated the major CRAs 
to a central role (King and Sinclair, 2003; Sinclair, 2001).  Because Basel II is now 
fully or partially implemented in over 30 countries (BIS, 2012), institutionalisation 
has arguably become the primary vector driving the increasing reliance of the 
global financial system on CRAs.  In other words, firms seek ratings (and prefer to 
hold rated assets) because doing so affords preferential regulatory treatment, 
regardless of whether the ratings are accurate. Indeed King and Sinclair’s (2003: 
354) prediction that institutionalisation would “undermine reputational constraints 
[and create a] complacent, parasitic rating industry” seems to have been borne out 
in the Wall Street and European crises. This issue may be particularly important 
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2.3. Review of Empirical Literature 
The empirical literature dealing with the construction of predictive models for 
credit ratings is broadly divisible by the type of country sampled. For developed 
markets a large literature based on extensive historical data exists. Seminal papers 
by Blume, Lim and MacKinlay (1998) and Amato and Furfine (2003) make use of 
ordered probit models to test for temporal consistency and procyclicality of ratings 
in American markets respectively. In similar studies, Altman and Rijken (2005) 
and Feng, Gourieroux and Jasiak (2008) use the ordered probit to contrast the 
consistency of through-the-cycle methodology versus point-in-time ratings. Two  
more mathematically sophisticated models are put forward by Nickell, Perraudin 
and Varato (2000) which use a series of linked ordered probit models to examine 
trends in rating migration, and Figlewski, Frydman and Liang (2012), which deals 
with macroeconomic effects on credit ratings using reduced-form Cox intensity 
models. Taken together, these studies find that a number of within-firm financial 
variables are highly significant and reliable predictors. Additionally, the papers 
find strong evidence that point-in-time rating changes respond to macroeconomic 
cycles, but that overall credit ratings are unresponsive to the cycle. This can be 
described as rating ‘stickiness’ followed by overreaction. Amato and Furfine 
(2003) attribute this finding to stagnation in credit ratings due to lack of 
monitoring, followed by over-sensitivity to present conditions when agencies do 
actually decide to make a rating change. This effect is analogous to the 
conservatism-overreaction phenomenon in behavioral finance first identified by De 
Bond and Thaler (1984). 
Papers analysing credit ratings in developing markets are different in focus 
and quality. There is an overwhelming concentration on the effect of a number of 
economic factors on sovereign credit ratings and vice-versa (for example Pennarz 
and Snoij, 2012). There is also a trend that focuses on the contribution of credit 
ratings to emerging-market crises. Kraeussl (2005) constructs an event study on 28 
emerging markets and reaches the conclusion that sovereign rating changes have a 
significantly deleterious impact on financial stability when a sudden round of 
downgrades occurs. Focusing mostly on East Asia, Reinhart (2002) finds that 
sovereign credit ratings fail to predict currency crises in emerging markets. 
Elkhoury (2009) uses simple statistics to raise concerns that the expansion of 
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CRAs into new markets will not only weaken financial systems (via the dual 
problems of conflicts of interest and rating stickiness) but also introduce the 
potential for overly tight macroeconomic policy arising from fiscal preoccupation 
with improving sovereign ratings. Among the few papers which include corporate 
ratings are Peter and Grandes (2005) and Ferri and Liu (2002).  The latter paper 
finds, using least squares that even when controlling for a number of market and 
macroeconomic factors, corporate ratings display undue reliance on sovereign 
ratings and thus CRAs “do not yet think globally”.  Peter and Grandes (2005) 
study of South Africa finds evidence of a ‘sovereign ceiling’ (i.e. corporate bonds 
rarely being rated above sovereign bonds) that does not seem to be justified by 
bond yield spreads.  Finally, in an innovative paper making use of ordered probit 
models, Purda (2008) finds that a country’s specific type of financial system is an 
important predictor of corporate ratings. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1. Data and Sampling Method 
Six emerging market economies with similar macroeconomic conditions were 
selected for investigation: Brazil, Chile, India, Nigeria, South Africa and Turkey. 
All of these economies are in the higher or lower-middle income classification and 
are designated “developing” economies by the World Bank (2012). All six 
countries have a well-developed region-leading financial system and, as the data 
presented below shows, have seen a significant rise in the number of corporate 
ratings over the period 2001 – 2012.  These countries have been chosen so as to 
give an early indication of the direction that CRA involvement might be expected 
to take in the future as financial globalization proceeds. Standard & Poor’s (2012) 
publish separate ratings for debt issued in local currencies and debt issued in 
foreign currency. Given that foreign and local ratings were observed to move 
together, and to avoid the need to add an exchange-rate control variable, only 
local-currency ratings were used. Standard & Poor’s (2012) publish long-term and 
short-term ratings. Long-term ratings are designed to be a-cyclical by employing 
estimation techniques that determine average probability of default through the 
business cycle. Since part of this investigation is concerned with testing for 
procyclicality, long-term ratings are the natural choice. Accepting the consensus in 
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the empirical literature surveyed above that credit ratings are subject to stickiness 
followed by over-reaction, it was decided to use one-dimensional point-in-time 
sampling rather than construct a time-series for each firm rated by S&P. This has 
the additional advantages of directly addressing the number of new rating issues 
over the 10 years sampled and greatly simplifying the analysis by precluding the 
need for panel-data modeling.  
Ratings were obtained from the Standard & Poor’s Global Credit Portal 
database. Grouping ratings into their main categories (Ignoring the +/- modifiers 
which are used to differentiate firms within a category) and recording all new 
ratings, upgrades and downgrades, a total sample size of 169 individual rating 
actions was obtained after removing outliers. Of this sample 98 observations are 
from Brazil, the country with the largest CRA presence and longest history of rated 
entities. In order to account for possible qualitative differences between Brazil and 
the other countries, all tests are repeated with and without Brazil in the sample. A 
further distinction is made between banks and non-bank firms, since the risk 
profile and financial structure of each are treated as qualitatively different by the 
big three ratings agencies (Peter and Grandes, 2005; Standard & Poor’s, 2012). It 
should be noted that this sub-sampling limits degrees of freedom in the model.  
Three sets of explanatory variables are used.  The first is the sovereign long-
term rating in local currency.  Developed-market studies often also use proxies for 
the level of market risk faced by the firm (for example, Blume et al., 1998). Data 
availability made it impossible to include reliable market risk measures in this 
paper. Secondly, following Amato and Furfine (2003) (with some modifications), 
three financial ratios are included in the model to account for within-firm default 
risks. All historical financial data is taken from the S&P Global Credit Portal with 
conversion into constant $US. All of these ratios are selected to control for the 
ability of the firm to cover debt obligations. Broadly, these ratios cover cash flow 
positions and leverage. Because of the different reporting of bank and non-bank 
financial statement in the Global Credit Portal, nominally different but 
conceptually identical ratios were used. The first ratio, interest coverage is taken as 
[EBIT/Interest Expense] in the case of non-bank firms and [Operating 
Revenue/Interest Expense] in the case of banks. This ratio accounts for the ability 
of corporates to meet the interest portion of their debt obligations. The second 
ratio, [Debt/Operating Income] for firms and [Liabilities/Operating Income] for 
 
© 2012 The author(s). African Review of Economics and Finance, Vol 4, No. 1, Dec 2012. 98 
 
banks, gives an indication of the ability of the firm to generate cash flows from 
operations to meet current and future obligations. Finally, the leverage ratio 
[Debt/Assets] for non-bank firms and [Liabilities/Assets] for banking firms is 
included to account for the amount of debt taken on by the business as a proportion 
of assets. The first two ratios give an indication of the cash flow position of the 
entity relative to obligations and the second gives a picture of the ability of the 
firm’s assets to cover total debts.  
The third class of explanatory variable attempts to account for county-level 
business cycles. The business cycle is a notoriously difficult concept to estimate. 
Amato and Fufine (2003) attempt to measure the output gap for the United States 
to signify the point in the business cycle during which a rating change was made. 
However, this measure is avoided because of the difficulty of measuring potential 
output and because parsimony dictates that as simple a model as possible should be 
used. The data for the period 2001-2012 captures one American recession, one 
global recession and long global boom, indicating that there is enough volatility in 
output to get a reasonable estimate of different cyclical effects. In specification 1 
real GDP growth, sourced from the IMF (2012) World Outlook Database, is used 
directly in the model. In Specification 2 the data series of Real GDP for each 
country is divided into three ordered segments. Observations falling below the first 
tertile are assigned a value of ‘-1’ to indicate a relative downturn over the decade 
under observation. ‘0’ is assigned to the middle segment and ‘1’ to values above 
the second tertile. This method gives a relative rather than absolute idea of the 
position of each economy in the cycle at the time of the rating action. For instance, 
although Brazilian GDP growth of 1% is positive, it falls into the lowest third of 
growth observations over the period and is therefore considered a relative 
downturn and assigned a value of ‘-1’. In both specifications an observation of the 
cycle at date of rating action and a 1-year lag are included. In the first specification 
current and lagged values for average real global GDP growth are included to 
capture the possibility that CRAs do not respond to local cycle indicators but rather 
to global conditions. In specification 2, global and local relative downturns 
occurred roughly simultaneously, so the global measure was unnecessary. 
Table 2 below presents descriptive statistics of the dataset. Note the difference 
between the average of the financial ratios between bank and non-bank firms, 
justifying the separation into different models. Note also that a) sovereign rating 
 
© 2012 The author(s). African Review of Economics and Finance, Vol 4, No. 1, Dec 2012. 99 
 
tend to be stable for long periods (with the exception of India and Turkey) and b) 
that most of the corporate rating events in the sample are upgrades.  These are 
significant points and are discussed further below.    
 
Dataset Size By Country   
 
  






























  Total     169 
Firm Type   
 
  





  Bank     40 
Rating Actions   
 
  










  Downgrade     30 
Firm-level Controls Average Max Min 
  Interest Coverage All 5.241 55.07 0 
    Bank 0.4338 2.22 0 
    Non-bank 4.939 55.07 0 
  Debt/Operating Income All 27.49 539 -190.46 
    Bank 92.21 539 -190.46 
    Non-bank 4.01 106.26 -123.54 
  Debt/Assets All 0.5169 0.96 0.03 
    Bank 0.8873 0.96 0.71 
    Non-bank 0.3824 0.86 0.03 
Sovereign Ratings   
 
  
  Brazil 2001 – 2012   
 
BB 
  Chile 2001 – 2012   
 
BBB 
  India 2001 – 01/30/2007   
 
BB 
    01/30/2007 – 2012   
 
BBB 
  Nigeria 2001 – 08/21/2009   
 
BB 
    08/21/2009 – 2012   
 
B 
  South Africa 2001 – 2012   
 
A 
  Turkey 2001 – 3/08/2004   
 
B 
    3/08/2004–09/20/2011   
 
BB 
    09/20/2011 -2012    BBB 
Table 2: Statistical Summary of Credit Rating Dataset 
 
3.2 Results 
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Tables 3 and 4 below. 
What stands out is a general lack of robustness to different specifications and 
estimations. This in itself is a significant finding, suggesting that the informational 
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  Firms Banks 
Predictor Inc. Brazil w/o Brazil Inc. Brazil w/o Brazil 
    
 
   
Intercept   
 
   
Interest Coverage 0.037 0.019 0.588 5.197 
Debt/Operating          Income 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.002 
Debt/Assets -3.295*** -5.08*** 11.283 112.413 
Local GDP -0.003 0.020 0.010 1.143 
Local GDP (Lagged) 0.017 0.044 0.079 -2.75*** 
Global GDP 0.018 -0.034 -0.017 -2.343 
Global GDP (Lagged) 0.020 0.056 -0.168 4.220 
Sovereign 0.440 0.907 1.334 16.589 
          
Residual DF 110 37 32 11 
AIC 295.951 121.264 123.404 25.071 
Significance ***= 1% 
 
  
  ** = 5% 
 
  
  * = 10%    
Table 3: Specification 1 –Prediction model with GDP Growth as indicator of the 
business cycle 
 
  Firms Banks 
Predictor Inc. Brazil w/o Brazil Inc. Brazil w/o Brazil 
    
 
   
Intercept   
 
   
Interest Coverage 0.035 0.019 1.058 0.521 
Debt/Operating Income 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.006 
Debt/Assets -3.318*** -4.959*** 11.020 75.018 
Cycle 0.138 0.058 0.600 1.328 
Cycle (Lagged) 0.129 0.294 0.301 -1.936 
Sovereign 0.460 0.789 1.159 8.731 
          
Residual DF 112 39 34 13 
AIC 318.509 116.456 115.83 25.40 
Significance *** = 1% 
  
  
  ** = 5% 
  
  
  * = 10%     
Table 3: Specification 2 – Prediction model with discrete relative indicator of 
business cycle. 
 
For non-bank firms the only consistently significant predictor is the 
[Debt/Assets] ratio, suggesting that CRAs take leverage seriously as an indicator of 
the probability of default. In fact, based on this model, it seems to be the only 
factor that CRAs consistently take into account. However, this ratio is not 
significant for banks, possibly because of low degrees of freedom in the bank 
sample or a different approach of CRAs to banks. Interest coverage and debt-to-
operating income ratios were not found to be significant with either specification 
or estimation technique. This is surprising given that these ratios provide an 
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immediate idea of the firm’s ability to meet obligations. The first specification of 
the business cycle returned only one significant predictor, that of a lagged local 
cycle observation for non-Brazilian banks. The second specification for the cycle 
produced no significant coefficients of cycles when predicting ratings. In both 
specifications the AIC reveals that the sample that excludes Brazil is superior to 
the sample that includes Brazil.  
One difficulty in predicting the model is the individual significance of the 
estimated partitions in the ordered probit, which in several cases were not found to 
be individually significant. Several corrective techniques such as discarding the 
proportional odds assumption in favour of weighting response likelihood by rating 
were attempted, but with negligible change to the AIC. A correlation matrix 
revealed that multicolinearity of explanatory variables was not a concern. Only 
GDP cycle observations in specification 1 produced correlation coefficients above 
0.45, and then with their own lag. 
The estimation reveals robust reliance on leverage ratios for non-banks. 
However, the dominant finding is that the model is very weak in predicting ratings. 
Only leverage ratios were a significant predictor, suggesting rating agencies may 
not be taking enough financial detail into account. The findings therefore do not 
present sufficient evidence to reject the operational hypothesis stated in the 
introduction. Ratings do not provide information that is not already readily 
available to investors. 
 
4. Discussion 
4.1. The Emerging Market Premium  
Despite the weak predictability in the model, ratings must be determined 
somehow by CRAs. It is proposed that the countries in the sample are subject to 
what could be called the ‘emerging market rating premium’, a process which could 
be described in heuristic form as follows: The dominant ‘input’ into the CRA 
models, whether explicit or implicit, is the ‘emerging market’ tag.  Emerging 
market sovereign ratings tend to be significantly below ‘developed market’ 
sovereign ratings.  Each sovereign rating then acts as an ‘upper bound’ (or 
‘sovereign ceiling’) to corporates domiciled in these countries.  The results suggest 
that the leverage ratio of the firm (but, intriguingly, not the bank) will have some 
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effect on rating below or at this upper bound.  The evidence that corporate ratings 
are poorly explained by the independent variables and cluster in a narrow range 
(Figure 1) is consistent with King and Sinclair’s (2003) prediction (discussed 
above) that institutionalisation driven by Basel II would “undermine  reputational 
constraints [and create a] complacent, parasitic rating industry”.  The study did not 
find significant reliance of corporate ratings on sovereign ratings.  A corollary of 
the ‘upper bound’ argument is that corporate ratings would respond 
asymmetrically of sovereign ratings.  Sovereign downgrades would trigger 
company downgrades on the credo ‘“firms are always riskier than governments” 
(Peter and Grandes, 2005: 9) but not necessarily vice versa.  However, there are 
few sovereign upgrades or downgrades in the sample.  An event study on a large 
sample of emerging market sovereign and corporate rating changes might shed 
further light on this question. 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of credit ratings 
 
 
These findings are consistent with the Peter and Grandes (2005) findings from 
South Africa.  Firstly, SASOL (briefly in 2003) was the only corporate rating to 
ever ‘pierce’ the upper bound. Secondly, Peter and Grandes (2005: 33) 
demonstrate that “there is clear evidence that the sovereign ceiling in [bond yield] 
spreads does not apply” for non-bank firms (it does for banks, which are regarded 
as far more vulnerable to financial crisis associated with sovereign downgrades).  
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This suggests that the ‘upper bound’ imposed by ratings agencies may be partly an 
artifact of the institutionalization of ratings, and adds weight to the hypothesis that 
corporate ratings may be inefficient and reflect the ideological biases of the ratings 
agencies (see Silver, 2011). 
 
4.2. The Emerging Market Premium 
The analysis has provided what can be seen as a ‘first pass’ at modeling the 
expansion of the credit rating industry into new markets. Results should be treated 
with skepticism until corroborated. Suggestions for further research include 
repeating the analysis using data from Moody’s and Fitch, adding a larger set of 
financial ratios to the analysis, estimating the market model for the firms receiving 
ratings and adding more countries to the dataset. However, if confirmed, the theory 
has wide-ranging implications. Only two will be raised here.  
Firstly, Mishkin (2006) presents the argument (criticized by inter alia, Rodrik 
and Subramanian, 2008) that efficient financial intermediation is the primary 
enabler of rapid economic growth, a path which, if followed, would lead to the 
‘next great globalisation’ as financial intermediation spurs the investment required 
for emerging markets to enter the global economy proper. Credit ratings should in 
theory aid the intermediation process between international capital pools and 
emerging market investment needs. Accurate ratings would help to correctly price 
interest rates, assisting with cost-of-capital models. A current example at time of 
publication is South Africa’s energy parastatal Eskom, which is aiming for a AA 
rating by 2018 in order to bring down the cost of raising capacity for the 
overburdened South African grid (Sapa, 2012). This is unlikely given the results 
above. Clearly the emerging market premium in fact hinders the efficient flow of 
capital by bundling emerging market ratings tightly around BB and BBB. This 
makes it difficult for international investors to use ratings to make investment 
decisions, and confirms the erroneous perception of homogeneity between 
emerging markets.  
The second application relates to the increasingly ambiguous position that 
CRAs enjoy as ‘outsourced’ but institutionalised quasi-regulators in Basel II and 
Basel III (BIS, 2009). This confers authority onto these institutions, which allows 
them a degree of control over the market from within the market. Ignoring for now 
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the political economy questions that arise from such a system, it is obvious from a 
practical perspective that the success of such a system is highly dependent on the 
accuracy of the CRAs’ opinions. The findings in this paper reveal that in the case 
of the sampled countries it would be risky to involve CRAs heavily in regulatory 
systems. For this reason it is advised that central banks be tasked with 
implementing Basel II and III give preference to the internal risk-assessment 
guidelines provided for in the Basel accords rather than allowing investors and 
banks to rely heavily on credit ratings.  
 
5. Conclusion 
It can be taken as a fact that the credit rating industry, spurred by the rise of 
technocratic regulatory systems, will continue its expansion into global markets. 
Because CRAs offer a service highly contingent on a number of local factors, 
quality of credit ratings can be uneven. The product offered by CRAs is understood 
economically as providing an important coordinating mechanism for capital 
markets. It is therefore vital from both an academic and policy perspective to gain 
an understanding of the early trends in corporate credit rating quality as the 
industry moves into new financial systems.   
The empirical findings are that corporate credit ratings in a sample of six 
emerging markets had fared poorly on informational content, with leverage ratios 
the only consistently significant variables. Credit ratings are not evenly distributed 
around the rating scale, a fact which makes ratings less informative, and would 
narrow the actions available to investors when following credit rating risk 
apportioning guides. Some data limitations on this model lead to the suggestion 
that further research be conducted to confirm the results. The inclusion of a market 
model to estimate the market risk of each firm and the inclusion of ratings from 
other agencies may make results more robust and ratings easier to predict.  
Based on the results attained in this model, it is hypothesized that emerging 
markets are collectively subject to an ‘emerging market rating premium’ which 
limits the distribution and informational quality of ratings. This suggests that 
CRAs do not necessarily enhance financial market efficiency in emerging markets 
in their present mode of operation. An optimal regulatory regime for countries like 
South Africa will likely have a place for corporate ratings from the big three 
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CRAs.  However, regulators should not treat them, and the NFA regulatory 
structure they represent, as ready-made ‘from the top down’ fixes (Best, 2003). 
 
Appendix 1: Ordered Probit Model 
For each rating category Ri there is a vector of predictors Xi that is specific to 
firm i. Using Fox’s (2010) derivation, there is an unobserved variable Zi that maps 
Xi onto Ri by means of a linear transformation: 
           
          
Where β is the vector of slope coefficients and ε is the white noise unobserved 
error. Zi is related to Ri via the link function: 
   {
               
                
              
 
       
where µr is the estimated partition point between rating grade r and r+1. 
Taking the cumulative probability distribution of P(Ri < r) = P(Zi < µr) forms the 
ordered probit, where the unknown coefficients β that maximize P(Zi < µr) on r are 
estimated using a maximum likelihood.  
 
Appendix 2: Notes on Data and Estimation 
Models were estimated using the MASS package on the R open source 
statistical computing language, run using the 64-bit linux distribution of the R-
Studio IDE.  
Unless otherwise stated, data was sourced from the Standard and Poor’s 
Global Credit Portal. The authors gratefully acknowledge Prof. Gavin Keeton at 
Rhodes University and Marissa Scott at Standard and Poor’s South Africa for their 
assistance with access to the database.   
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